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# Moldávia

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A 11 de julho de 2021, a Moldávia teve eleições antecipadas<sup>2</sup>, que surgiram na sequência da dissolução do Parlamento por dificuldades na aprovação do Primeiro-Ministro após as eleições de 2019, tendo o Parlamento sido dissolvido a 28 de Julho desse mesmo ano<sup>3</sup>. Todavia, em Fevereiro de 2020 começa a pandemia da Covid-19, sendo que a 31 de Março de 2021 a Presidente da Moldávia tinha decretado o «estado de emergência», tendo tal decreto sido anulado

a 28 de Abril, por forma a que o parlamento pudesse ser dissolvido conforme ditavam os preceitos constitucionais.

Seria assim, no meio da pandemia, que se realizaram as eleições para o Parlamento da Moldávia, as segundas no espaço de dois anos, eleições essas, tal como revela o quadro seguinte, que registaram uma taxa de abstenção de 47,70%.

Quadro 1 - MOLDÁVIA

Tipo de Eleição	Ano	Taxa de Abstenção
Legislativas	2021	47,70%
	2019	50,72%
	2014	44,20%

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2 Sobre a análise a estas eleições, cf. Manuel Monteiro, Bárbara Miranda, Anibal Fernandes, «Parliamentary elections in the Republic of Moldova (11 of July of 2021)», in *POLIS*, n.º 4 (2021), pp. 179-183. Disponível in <http://revistas.lis.ulusia-da.pt/index.php/polis/article/view/3002/3588>

3 De modo a percebermos um pouco a crise política que esteve em causa na Moldávia, tomemos parte do relatório da ODIHR sobre as eleições legislativas de 2021, disponível in <https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/moldova/488497>:

Following the February 2019 parliamentary elections [...] The new parliament had difficulty establishing the majority necessary for a vote of confidence in a new government. In June 2019, despite their markedly different policies, parties [...] agreed on a government with Maia Sandu as Prime Minister (PM). However, in November 2019 Sandu's government was ousted through a vote of no-confidence and replaced [...].

Maia Sandu was elected President in the second round of the November 2020 election, [...]. Before and after her election, Ms. Sandu repeatedly stated that she would seek early parliamentary elections as soon as possible, while the PSRM, PDM, and the Șor Party stated that they prefer that elections be held later.

In December 2020, PM Chicu resigned, with the stated aim of paving the way for early parliamentary elections. According to the Constitution, the president nominates a prime minister after consultations with parliamentary factions. If parliament declines to approve a new government at least twice, the president may dissolve parliament. On 11 February 2021, parliament rejected President Sandu's first nominee for PM [...].

On 16 March, Ms. Durlășteanu announced that she no longer wished to be considered for PM. President Sandu promptly nominated Igor Grosu, [...]. After a majority of deputies did not attend the vote on Mr. Grosu's candidature, President Sandu asked the Constitutional Court to verify whether the constitutional conditions for dissolving parliament had been met.

On 31 March, parliament declared a state of emergency citing the COVID-19 pandemic. [...]. On 15 April, the Constitutional Court ruled that the President was entitled to dissolve parliament. On 28 April, the Constitutional Court annulled the state of emergency. On the same day, President Sandu dissolved parliament and called for early parliamentary elections on 11 July.

Da análise objetiva dos dados, podemos verificar que a taxa de abstenção foi menor no período pandémico do que nas eleições imediatamente anteriores. É um facto que não deixa de ser curioso, se atendermos que nas legislativas de 2019 o número de abstencionistas tinha subido 6,52% em relação às legislativas de 2014.

Pensamos ser ainda relevante fazer referência às últimas eleições presidenciais (Novembro de 2020), precisamente por também se terem realizado em período pandémico. Neste caso, ao compararmos os dados da participação eleitoral registada com as presidenciais de 2016, verificamos que se há uma muito ligeira subida da abstenção na 1ª volta de 2020 face à 1ª volta de 2016 (+ 0,64%), não podemos igualmente deixar de constatar que se verificou o inverso na 2ª volta das eleições. Com efeito, enquanto na 2ª volta das presidenciais de 2016, a taxa de abstenção foi de 46,55%, já na 2ª volta de 2020 ela situou-se em 41,78% (- 4,77%).

Quadro 2 - MOLDÁVIA

Tipo de Eleição	Ano	Taxa de Abstenção
Presidenciais	2020 (2ª volta)	41,78%
	2020 (1ª volta)	51,46%
	2016 (2ª volta)	46,55%
	2016 (1ª volta)	50,82%

Poder-se-á deste modo considerar, que a pandemia Covid-19 não contribuiu para aumentar a abstenção. Curiosamente a participação eleitoral foi até superior quer nas eleições legislativas, quer na 2ª volta das eleições presidenciais. Terá sido isso um reflexo de me-

didadas especiais adotadas, tendo em vista facilitar o exercício do direito de votos dos eleitores moldavos? Não o entendemos assim. Se é verdade que a pandemia pode ter contribuído para a convocação de eleições antecipadas, não é menos verdade que essa mesma pandemia apenas implicou a adoção de algumas medidas e recomendações. Como retrata o relatório da ODIHR<sup>4</sup>, vemos que foi utilizada uma plataforma digital para o registo dos eleitores e a descarga do voto dos cadernos eleitorais. Em termos do exercício prático do voto, houve só uma alteração que se traduziu no *mobile vote*<sup>5</sup> para os que se encontravam internados, presos ou que por motivos de força maior e bem fundados não se pudessem deslocar à urna de voto, sendo que nesses casos *the person was able to request to be served with a mobile ballot box at home*.

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4 Cf. supra, nota 2.

5 O *mobile vote* traduz-se na possibilidade de a urna se deslocar aos eleitores que não podem, no dia da eleição, ir até ao local de voto.

A par com isto ainda existe o “voto em mobilidade”, para os estudantes, que podem no dia da eleição deslocar-se a um outro local de voto que não o do seu recenseamento.

# Moldova

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On July 11, 2021, Moldova had early elections<sup>2</sup>, which emerged following the dissolution of Parliament due to difficulties in obtaining the Prime Minister's approval after the 2019 elections, with Parliament being dissolved on July 28 of that same year<sup>3</sup>. However, in February 2020 the Covid-19 pandemic begins, and on March 31, 2021, the President of Moldova had decreed a "state of emergency", this decree having been annulled on April 28, so that the parliament could be dis-

solved as determined by the constitutional precepts. It would be like this, amid the pandemic, that the elections for the Parliament of Moldova were held, the second in the scope of two years, these elections, as shown in the following table, registered an abstention rate of 47.70%.

**Table 1 - MOLDOVA**

Type of Election	Year	Abstention Rate
Parliamentary	2021	47,70%
	2019	50,72%
	2014	44,20%

From the objective analysis of the data, we can see that the abstention rate was lower in the pandemic period than in the immediately preceding elections. It is a curious fact if we consider that in the 2019 legislative elections, the number of abstentionists had risen by 6.52% compared to the 2014 vote.

We think it is still relevant to refer to the last presidential elections (November 2020), precisely because they also took place during a pandemic period. In this case, when comparing the registered electoral turnout data with the presidential elections, we see that if there is a very slight increase in abstention in the 1st round of 2020 compared to the 1st round of 2016 (+ 0.64%), we cannot fail to note that the opposite occurred in the 2nd round of the elections. While in the 2nd round of the 2016 presidential elections, the abstention rate was 46.55%, in the 2nd round of 2020 it stood at 41.78% (-4.77%).

**Table 2 - MOLDOVA**

Type of Election	Year	Abstention Rate
Presidential	2020 (2 <sup>a</sup> round)	41,78%
	2020 (1 <sup>a</sup> round)	51,46%
	2016 (2 <sup>a</sup> round)	46,55%
	2016 (1 <sup>a</sup> round)	50,82%

In this way, it can be considered that the Covid-19 pandemic did not contribute to increasing abstention. Interestingly, voter turnout was even higher both in the legislative elections and in the 2nd round of the presidential elections. Was this a reflection of special measures taken to facilitate the exercise of voting rights by Moldovan voters? We don't understand it in that way. If it is true that the pandemic may

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- 2 On the analysis of these elections, see Monteiro, M., Miranda, B & Fernandes, A., «Parliamentary elections in the Republic of Moldova (11 of July of 2021)», in POLIS, n.º 4 (2021), pp. 179-183. Available at <http://revistas.lis.ulusiada.eu/index.php/polis/article/view/3002/3588>
- 3 In order to understand a little about the political crisis that was at stake in Moldova, we must look at the ODIHR report on the 2021 legislative elections, available in <https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/moldova/488497>: Following the February 2019 parliamentary elections [...] The new parliament had difficulty establishing the majority necessary for a vote of confidence in a new government. In June 2019, despite their markedly different policies, parties [...] agreed on a government with Maia Sandu as Prime Minister (PM). However, in November 2019 Sandu's government was ousted through a vote of no-confidence and replaced [...]. Maia Sandu was elected President in the second round of the November 2020 election, [...]. Before and after her election, Ms. Sandu repeatedly stated that she would seek early parliamentary elections as soon as possible, while the PSRM, PDM, and the Șor Party stated that they prefer that elections be held later. In December 2020, PM Chicu resigned, with the stated aim of paving the way for early parliamentary elections. According to the Constitution, the president nominates a prime minister after consultations with parliamentary factions. If parliament declines to approve a new government at least twice, the president may dissolve parliament. On 11 February 2021, parliament rejected President Sandu's first nominee for PM [...]. On 16 March, Ms. Durlășteanu announced that she no longer wished to be considered for PM. President Sandu promptly nominated Igor Grosu, [...]. After a majority of deputies did not attend the vote on Mr. Grosu's candidature, President Sandu asked the Constitutional Court to verify whether the constitutional conditions for dissolving parliament had been met. On 31 March, parliament declared a state of emergency citing the COVID-19 pandemic, [...]. On 15 April, the Constitutional Court ruled that the President was entitled to dissolve parliament. On 28 April, the Constitutional Court annulled the state of emergency. On the same day, President Sandu dissolved parliament and called for early parliamentary elections on 11 July.

have contributed to the calling of early elections, it is no less true that this same pandemic only implied the adoption of some measures and recommendations.

As the ODIHR<sup>4</sup> report shows, we see that a digital platform was used to register voters and download the vote from the electoral roll. In terms of the practical exercise of voting, there was only one change that resulted in the *mobile vote*<sup>5</sup> for those who were hospitalized, imprisoned, or those who, for reasons of force majeure and well-founded, could not go to polling stations, in which case *the person was able to request to be served with a mobile ballot box at home*.

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4 See above, note 2.

5 The *mobile vote* translates into the possibility of the ballot box traveling to voters who cannot, on Election day, go to the polling place. In addition to this, there is also the “mobility vote”, for students, who can, on Election Day, travel to another place of voting than the one where they registered.